Reform of the United Nations
This was a chapter of a report titled “The Crisis in Multilateralism: What can Europe do?” published by UK in a Changing Europe.
Long-term Challenges
The United Nations has faced calls for reform virtually since its founding. Yet the organisation has proven notoriously difficult to effectively restructure, even as the world around it has changed dramatically. In many ways it is unsurprising that the UN represents a unique management challenge. Ultimately, it is the sum of its membership, and aligning 193 member states – all with different national interests and approaches – on budget, policy, and organisational blueprints is incredibly complex.
And clearly some of the structures that made sense in 1945 when the UN was founded don’t look very modern today. The most emblematic of these is the disproportionate influence of permanent members of the Security Council, which holds binding authority over efforts to maintain peace and security. Since the founding, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have held veto power over all decisions made in the Security Council, including, effectively, final say over the selection of the Secretary-General. Their institutional weight goes beyond the Council, however, as key senior leadership positions within the wider UN system are ringfenced for nationals from the ‘permanent five’. Like any other bureaucracy, UN agencies, funds, and programmes often also play a role in the resistance to change. They defend their turf, try to expand their resources and staffing, and push back against reforms designed to limit or streamline their scope. With agreements often relying on consensus among a broad array of stakeholders, it has always been relatively easy for spoilers to torpedo reform.
Impact of recent geopolitical developments
Recent events, however, have made UN reform an imperative. Geopolitics are turbulent: armed conflict is at its highest level since the end of the Second World War. The conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, and elsewhere underscore the inability of the UN to be effective when its member states block it from doing so.Russia, the aggressor of the war in Ukraine, continues to veto any UN action, or even effective mediation, to end that conflict.
And last year, when more people went to the polls than at any other time in history, incumbents lost ground around the world as post-pandemic economic and social dissatisfaction continued. In the eyes of some in the Global South, the vaccine nationalism that followed the Covid-19 pandemic pushed the limits of the EU and UK’s commitment to international solidarity. Member states did negotiate and agree to a Pandemic Accord in May of this year, including actions to promote equitable access to vaccines.
Then, the second Trump administration ramped up the pressure on the UN even further. The United States has thus far withheld its 2025 UN regular budget contribution, leaving a 22% gap. In response, the Secretary-General has proposed cost-cutting measures, including a 15.1% reduction in resources and 18.8% in the regular budget for 2026, as UN entities addressing issues like climate change, human rights, and women’s health face significant cuts in funding from member states. This has created an expectation amongst member states and external observers that there are significant efficiencies to be found but a vision for the path forward is yet to be established. Moreover, as the central architect and guarantor of the post-1945 multilateral order, the current US withdrawal also leaves a leadership vacuum, a ‘world minus one’. Politically and economically, the status quo has become untenable. In response, the Secretary-General has launched ‘UN80’, a major reform push framed around the 80th anniversary of the UN’s founding. The initiative is underpinned by three workstreams: efficiency and improvements, a mandate implementation review, and potential structural changes and programme realignments.
The role of the UK and EU
The UK and the EU are well positioned to be important drivers for sensible reform. As Ursula von der Leyen declared in April 2025, “the West as we knew it no longer exists”. In a world without US leadership, London and Brussels have a great deal at stake in modernising the system to work for all, in preserving the values expressed in the UN Charter, and meeting operational needs, from healthcare to humanitarian relief, around the globe.
In UN80 negotiations, the EU delegation has emphasised that the reforms must balance the three pillars of the UN – Peace and Security, Human Rights, and Sustainable Development – and retain the institution’s normative role. This differs from the ‘back to basics’ approach being modelled by the United States, that prioritises peace and security over other programmes including climate change and gender inequality.
Together, the UK and EU undoubtedly wield an outsized influence. The UK is a permanent member of the Security Council with a significant diplomatic presence in New York and the other UN headquarters. The EU presents an organised, joint, vision of 27 member states who have a relatively large diplomatic presence, one of which is a permanent member. Across the system, the UK and EU sit on the governing boards of the agencies, funds, and programs, are often among the largest funders, and have numerous nationals in key positions. The EU and its member states are the largest financial contributor to the UN. Working together, a UK-EU partnership can drive and shape the negotiation and implementation of the UN80 reforms.
But to be successful, the UK-EU partnership will need to recognise and encourage the growing influence of the Global South in decision-making. In a multipolar world, they will need to look south to build partnerships with developing countries, be that Brazil, the African Union, India, or the pacific islands and find common ground on the priorities and underlying principles of a renewed UN.
Alone, the UK and EU will not be able to uphold their core interest throughout the UN80 negotiations. With a disengaged US, the UK-EU-Global South dynamic will be central to the passage of reforms. Recent UN agreements, from the Pact of the Future and the Financing for Development negotiations to the Pandemic Accords and Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, show the Global South seizing agency after years of under-representation.
A commitment to building a multilateral system with equitable power-sharing, and adequate institutional representation of the voice and interests of the Global South, will go a long way to supporting a renewed system with the existing values at its core – and directly advancing UK and EU interests while doing so. In practice, this involves shifting to models of genuine partnership, where developing countries shape their development priorities, and embracing formal institutional changes that empower Global South engagement in UN negotiations and decision-making.
