UN80: An Explainer
As the United Nations grapples with major budget and resultant staff cuts, it has launched ‘UN80’ – a major reform and reorganization effort. This explainer details the contours of this important process and key lessons gleaned from the process to date and on the road ahead.
What is UN80?
Launched by Secretary-General António Guterres in March 2025 to coincide with the UN’s 80th anniversary later this year, UN80 is a significant management and budget reform effort. As the UN itself has described the initiative, it is “a system-wide push to streamline operations, sharpen impact, and reaffirm the UN’s relevance for a rapidly changing world.” Acknowledging that multilateralism continues to face a difficult global landscape, senior leaders also hope the effort will “reaffirm the UN’s relevance for a rapidly changing world” by making the institution nimbler and more fit for purpose in addressing rapidly evolving challenges. Running counter to this hope, some outsiders expect that UN80 will more likely result in the UN doing “less with less” – using a smaller budget to achieve a constrained number of objectives. This does not align with the stated vision of strengthening the institution, but it may just be a requirement of the context.
Why Now?
It is not uncommon for major anniversaries of the UN to become a platform for reform. As recently as 2020, the 75th anniversary of the UN led to the release of the Secretary-General’s ‘Our Common Agenda’. report and set us on the path to the Pact for the Future, agreed four years later. In this light alone, UN80 does not stand out as particularly unique.
What is remarkable about UN80, however, is the sense of urgency felt by both the Secretariat and Member States to implement a fundamental series of reforms that reshape the institution and how it implements its mandates. Undoubtedly, this is at least partly accredited to the moment we are in as the world faces monumental joint challenges as conflict and geopolitical tension heightens. However, we can not ignore the critical background of the UN’s budget crunch, or “liquidity crisis” as it has frequently been called.
This budget crisis has been driven in no small part by the delinquency of Member States in paying their dues and assessments. The UN notes that the United States has $1.5 billion in arrears, China $597 million, Russia $72 million, Saudi Arabia $42 million, and Mexico $38 million (among others.) Further exacerbating the UN’s budget problem, the United States under President Trump has drastically cut, or in some cases eliminated, its voluntary contributions to a number of agencies where it has traditionally been a dominant donor, such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Food Programme (WFP), UN Women, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). And while the United States may be the most dramatic case, a number of European states have also cut back their UN contributions further adding to the squeeze.
The Secretary-General, and senior figures in the UN80 Task Force, have clearly stated that actions to address the financial crisis and UN80 reforms are separate tracks that, unfortunately, have coincided with each other. You’d expect this response to the emphatic insistence from Member States that UN80 must, under no circumstances, be a reaction to the budget crisis nor exist of cost-cutting exercises. Guy Ryder, the Secretary-General’s appointment to lead the reform efforts, argued that “Yes, we do face financial challenges. No need to avert our eyes from that. But this is not a cost-cutting, downsizing exercise. We want to make the UN stronger.” The UN Controller, Mr. Chandramouli Ramanathan, argued in a briefing to Member States that the 15-20 percent budget cuts target was simply to force the institution to seriously consider reforms, and a lower target of 5 or 10 percent would lead to only small tweaks at the fringe.
The simultaneous nature of the two reform tracks, some confusing communications, and the inclusion of budget and staff cutting goals in UN80 have blurred the lines for both Member State and external observers. For many, therefore, it is difficult to define where UN80 ends and addressing the budget crisis begins.
All of that said, no one involved wants UN80 simply to be a budgetary exercise, and two other big issues are deeply intertwined with the reform effort. First, even its most ardent supporters acknowledge that the United Nations is in need of significant reform. Over the 80 years it has been in existence, the UN’s organigram and operations have become increasingly complex, overlapping, and byzantine. As Member States have layered on responsibility after responsibility, the UN system now is made up of some 140 different entities, including more than 67 Secretariat Departments and Offices, more than 33 Peacekeeping Operation and Political Missions, more than 15 Funds, and more than 14 specialized agencies. UN80 represents a welcome and overdue (but certainly not easy) opportunity to bring far greater coherence and rationality to these systems by streamlining this organizational structure and reducing the significant overlap in mission and operations
The other big issue confronting Member States and the Secretary-General through the UN80 process is how much the world has changed since the UN was founded in 1945, as World War II still raged. The Global South, treated as a relative afterthought during the UN’s founding, is rightly demanding greater say in the international political, economic, and security structures that impact them deeply.
How Does It Work?
The Secretary-General has appointed a Task Force, headed by the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Policy, Guy Ryder, to lead the UN80 effort. This Task Force includes 15 principals from the UN Secretariat Agencies, Funds, Programs, and Regional Commissions supported by a modest staff evaluating proposals and engaging in outside consultations. The Task Force has been charged with directing three workstreams:
Efficiencies and Improvements: This workstream, directed by a working group led by Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance Catherine Pollard, is focused on cost-savings and efficiencies across the organization. This includes reductions in overall staff levels, potentially relocating staff from more expensive duty stations to less expensive locations, and consolidating information technology and support services. While not mentioned explicitly, it would also be hoped that this workstream is exploring efficiencies in the UN compensation and benefits system – a significant source of expense that previous reform efforts have largely left untouched.
Mandate Implementation Review: The UN80 Task Force is undergoing a review of the 3,919 mandates that were cited in the 2025/2026 budget proposals to examine how they are being implemented, and how this could be improved. The Task Force has collected initial findings on the mandates, including where they come from, how agencies use different citing practices, what mandates are most often cited, and what parts of the UN system overlap on mandate implementation. A new registry of mandates has been developed. By the end of July 2025, the Task Force will create another registry for operational paragraphs and the Secretary-General will release a report on the mandate implementation review.
It is important to note that it is a separate process from a mandate review, where Member States work together to determine if mandates should be combined, altered, or eliminated. The Secretary-General has clearly stated that his authority ends at the implementation of the mandates and any changes to the mandate themselves must be done by an intergovernmental process — one that he encourages. As a previous mandate review effort in 2006 made clear, there is often not a bright line between cutting mandates and achieving savings, and trying to retroactively adjudge the relative merit of all of its existing mandates is an extraordinarily complex and politically thorny task. Asking Member States what it should not be doing may be less effective than asking Member States what its highest priorities should be. Interestingly, this effort aligns with the work on the revitalization of the General Assembly, where Rev. 1 included a number of measures designed to reduce limitations and mandate sunset clauses.
Structure and Program Realignment: This process goes to the fundamental organization of the UN systems itself and identifying areas where restructuring could lead to more effective and efficient operations. This workstream is directed by seven distinct “clusters” that separate UN agencies by their thematic and operational focus. See more detail about the clusters below. These consultations could bring about the most high-profile changes to the face of the UN system and result in the most significant changes, good or bad, to the role the United Nations plays in the world. Most observers believe that this workstream will result in proposals to merge multiple parts of the UN organigram together to reduce overlap, achieve cost savings, and make due with the impact of staff cuts.
What are the Clusters?
Each of the seven clusters bring together UN organizations that are contributing to similar specific global objectives with general overlap in interests and potentially activities and programs. The Secretary-General has described the cluster groups as “the locomotive force for concrete proposals,” and noted that they will “operate at the high level of ambition that our times demand.” Each of these clusters, save one, has multiple coordinators.
These seven clusters are broadly defined as:
Peace and Security. Coordinated by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), Department of Peace Operations (DPO), Office of Counter-Terrorism (OCT), and the Office for Disarmament Affairs;
Development (Secretariat). Coordinated by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP);
Development (UN System). Coordinated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the Development Coordination Office;
The Secretary-General justified two separate clusters for development by arguing that the corresponding work in the Secretariat and in the wider system differ significantly. The two clusters are charged with closely coordinating on their reform efforts.
Humanitarian. Coordinated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
Human Rights. Coordinated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
Training and Research. Coordinated by the United Nations University (UNU) and United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).
Specialized Agencies. Coordinated by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and International Labour Organization (ILO).
While the idea of clusters is logical given the shared interests in many of these areas, it does raise some questions. First, every cluster, with the exception of human rights, has multiple coordinators without seeming to have a designated lead, which could well lead to considerable institutional jockeying for position. Second, and more importantly, the UN agencies are effectively being asked to design their own reforms. And while they obviously have to be given a seat and bring enormous expertise to the table, having these institutions drive the process without much in what seems to be the way of advice or consultation from Member States or outside experts feels like a lost opportunity to interject new energy and insight into the process. The fear is that the respective agencies will closely guard their most important prerogatives and senior leadership structures when that may not be what is most valuable in the process.
UN80 Timeline
March 13, 2025: Secretary-General launches UN80.
April 25, 2025: Internal memo issued that urges agencies in New York and Geneva to consider moving staff to lower-cost locations, the memo is leaked in the days following.
May 2, 2025: Leak of internal memo including sweeping structural reform proposals published byReuters.
May 12, 2025: Secretary-General briefs the General Assembly on UN80.
June 13 2025: Deadline for Clusters to share initial direction of travel with the Task Force; Deadlin for Secretary-General to present revised budget estimates to the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget Questions (ACABQ).
June 24, 2025: Under Secretary-General Guy Ryder updates the General Assembly on UN80.
July 31, 2025: Clusters to provide final proposal to the Secretary-General.
September 23 - 29, 2025: UNGA High Level Week, Secretary-General to present proposals to the Member States.
What about that Leaked Memo?
In early May 2025, a leak of an internal UN80 Task Force memo, “UN80 structural changes and programmatic realignment: Compilation of non-attributable suggestions by the UN80 Task Force,” triggered considerable press coverage and no small amount of consternation among UN staff and outside groups. The bulleted list, among other things, highlighted some sweeping potential changes, such as merging OCHA, UNHCR, and IOM into a single “UN Humanitarian Response and Protection Organization,” merging UNAIDS into the World Health Organisation (WHO), and merging operational responsibilities and capabilities of WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WHO in “humanitarian and conflict affected” contexts. UN officials, responding to the outcry about many of these suggestions (including from some institutions that were included in the memo but for whom the UN80 Task Force does not have responsibility), offered little in the way of comment on the document other than to cite them as general “suggestions” that the Tas Force was exploring in its work.
Giving the Task Force the benefit of the doubt, such speculative lists for potential reforms are a normal parr of that process. That said, the leak did raise concerns about the ability of the Task Force and the Secretary-General in effectively managing the challenging messaging, politics, diplomacy, and internal and external communications around UN80.
How is UN80 being received?
The reception to UN80 has been mixed to date. Most Member States seem inclined to allow the Secretariat and Task Force a significant degree of latitude – recognizing the difficult position in which the United Nations as an institution finds itself and eager to maintain a functioning multilateral system. That reservoir of good will, naturally, will be tested as the process continues.
UN staff, facing deep cuts in their ranks, have been less sanguine about the process. The UN Staff Union has complained about the relative lack of transparency in the process, understandably upset that many key steps in the process to date have come via leaks published in media outlets. The Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions and Associations complained in a recent letter that, while it was “mindful of the current funding challenges”, it believes “the rushed and chaotic manner in which these changes are being implemented is causing deeper harm to both the effectiveness and reputation of the United Nations.”
Others have expressed concern that the rush to merge agencies and functions could be deeply deleterious in other ways. Some worry that specialized functions, such as human rights, will receive far less emphasis if multiple agencies are suddenly housed under one roof. Others worry that entire areas of emphasis, such as gender, will fall off the map under an approach where the agencies view themselves as only able to focus on select “core” functions.
Conclusion: What Does ‘Good’ Reform Look Like?
The stakes involved in the UN80 process are high and will have an enormous impact on the hopes and aspirations of people across the globe. Several important takeaways have already emerged from the process to date.
UN80 would benefit from a clear, affirmative vision for reform and what a modern UN should look like. The formation of the United Nations was driven by a collective vision for what a more peaceful, prosperous world might look like in the waning days of World War II. Equally true, UN80 will be effective to the degree that Member States and civil society can formulate a vision for what role a leaner, more effective United Nations should be playing in the world, where its comparative advantages lie, and how the organization can best meet the challenges of today – and tomorrow. The UN must be honest about the spaces in which it does not perform well or where other actors are better positioned for implementation. Reform will ultimately be judged by whether it makes a real difference for people on the ground.
Politics is as important as good ideas. UN reform is not new, and there are no shortages of good ideas. The history of UN reform is littered with good ideas that haven’t taken hold because they were poorly or clumsily executed. UN80 doesn’t need to start from a blank slate, which would be a waste of both time and resources, it needs to figure out how to get effective reforms over the finish line – which means understanding and managing the politics of reform through effective diplomacy and alignment of Member State interests. UN80 is not just about management efficiencies, it needs to be a deliberate, strategic, and careful process to build political support for reforms among Member States, the Secretariat, agencies, and civil society.
Reform will not be a simple, linear process. Different parts of the UN system will be easier and harder to reform, and UN80 should not be viewed as a single package that will be neatly delivered by a set date. Actions will need to be modular and will range from the immediate to the long-term and will ultimately stretch across the terms of two Secretaries-General. Critically, implementing reform will involve a complex web of coalitions and constellations of supportive partners.
The first six months of the next Secretary-General’s tenure will be critical to the reform effort. The next Secretary-General will be responsible for much of the implementation of UN80 and it is critical, therefore, that the selected individual has the mandate, experience, and required understanding of Member State and internal Secretariat dynamics to do so. The selection process will be key.
Member States and outside experts need to be more active in driving the process. It is natural for the Secretary-General and task force to prefer to treat reform largely as an internal process, and the Secretary-General does enjoy considerable discretion to push through efficiencies and changes. That said, the Task Force certainly does not have a monopoly on good ideas and outside perspectives are vital. For example, the recent memo by a group of United Nations Resident Coordinators in Africa suggesting reforms to the resident coordinator system represents a wonderful contribution of insight from the field. The more that Member States can coalesce around those areas where they have the most expertise, insight, and interest, the more likely we are going to be to see effective coalitions for reform.
LDCs, in particular, should seek to harmonize their approaches and positions with regard to UN80 and reform. It is these groups of states that are most likely to suffer the results of cuts in staff and programs in areas like global public health, humanitarian assistance, and economic development, and they very clearly deserve a say in how they are managed. Further, given the understandable concern that much of the fundamental design of multilateralism disadvantages the Global South, they will only effect meaningful change if they are able to work together as a community able to leverage their collective voice and drive change.
The entire enterprise of multilateral cooperation is at an important inflection point. The challenge for Member States and all those who care about international cooperation is to respond to the admittedly challenging exigencies of the moment while simultaneously shaping a United Nations that meets the needs and aspirations of future generations. While this is no small task, the remarkable journey of the last 80 years suggests that it is not one without considerable hope.